こんにちは。
今日は、すでに公開され、主に外務省と左翼側の人間たちが見ていた、ホイットニー文書を以下、紹介します。
今後、公開されるはずの「ヒロヒト・ファイル」は、マッカーサーとの会話内容と、ＢＩＳでの権限、そして、日本の占領政策に関連するものだと私は聞いています。まだ、実見しておりませんが。
以下の内容だけでも、昭和天皇の終戦当時の、日本国民に対する考えと姿勢が分かります。
http://zenkyoto68.tripod.com/CourtneyWhitney1.htm
私が、これを知ったのは、 ｎｕｅｑｌｂ さんのＨＰから。
http://nueq.exblog.jp/m2013-08-01/
出てきた画面をしばらくスクロールしていくと、「ホイットニー文書」が出てきて、解説があります。
「ヒロヒト発言記録（1946・4～6）
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・
昭和天皇の極秘発言 ホイットニー文書
この文書は、昭和天皇ヒロヒトが占領軍司令部に対し表明した見解の要約が全編にわたり記された、「極秘」扱いの、英文三頁以上にわたるメモランダムである。1946年4月から6月の間に、東京駐在の国務省員によって作成され、マッカーサーの腹心であったコートニー・ホイットニーの私物として保管された後、1970年代前半にヴァージニア州ノーフォークのマッカーサー記念館に寄贈され、1978年に機密解除されている。
ホイットニー文書
【以下がヒロヒトの発言記録（１９４６・４～６）】
二、三週間前に占領が長く続くべきであるとの希望を述べた根拠を説明したい。日本人の心には未だ封建制の残滓が多く残っており、それを眼こそぎにするには長い時間がかかるだろうと感じている。
日本人は全体として、自己の民主化に必要な教育に欠けており、さらに真の宗教心にも欠けており、そのため一方の極端から他方の極端へと揺れやすい。日本人の封建的特徴の一つは、進んで人に従おうとする性格にあり、日本人はアメリカ人のように自分で考える訓練を受けていない。
徳川政権は、民は指導者に従うべきであり、そのため忠誠心以外はいかなる道理も与えられてはならない、という論理のうえに築かれていた。かくして、平均的な日本人は、自分で考えることにおいて昔からの障害に直面している。かなり闇雲に従うという本能によって、現在、日本人はアメリカ的な考えを受け容れようと熱心に努力しているが、例えば労働者の状況を見れば、彼らは自分本位に権利ばかりに注意を集中し、本分と義務について考えていない。
この理由は、ある程度、長年の日本人の思考と態度における氏族性に求められる。日本人が藩に分割されていた時代は、完全には終っていない。平均的日本人は、自分の親戚はその利益を追求すべき友人とみなし、他の人間はその利益を考慮するに値しない敵と考えている。
日本人の間には宗教心が欠如している。私は神道を宗教とは考えていない。それは儀式に過ぎず、合衆国では甚だ過大評価されてきたと考えている。しかし、たいていの神道信者は超保守的で、彼らと、神道と超国家主義を同一視していた復員兵とその他の者は、しっかりと結びつく傾向を持っているので、依然として危険な面がある。政府は、信教の自由に関する命令を厳守する立場にあり、現在彼らを取り締まる手段を持っていないために、こうした状況は危険だ。神道を奉じる分子とその同調者は反米的なので警戒を要すると考えている。
以上のようなことから、私は今は日本人のもつ美点を述べている場合ではなく、むしろその欠点を考える時だと感じている。
私は、マッカーサー元帥と元帥の行っていることにたいへん大きな感銘を受けている。また、対日理事会におけるアメリカの態度にとても感謝し、それが安定効果を持つと感じている。
しかし、私は今、この国の労働状況をかなり憂慮している。日本の労働者は、物事を真似する事において、義務を等閑にして自分の権利を利己的に追求しやすく、米国のストライキから有害な影響を受けるので、米国の炭坑ストが速やかに解決するよう希望している。
自分の治世に与えられた名前 ―昭和、啓発された平和― も今となっては皮肉なように思えるが、自分はその名称を保持することを望み、真に「煌く平和」の治世となるのを確実にするまでは、生き長らえたいと切に願っている。
私は鈴木(貫太郎)提督の被った損失に心を痛めている。鈴木は、降伏準備のための内閣を率いるよう私が命じたのであり、海軍の恩給ばかりでなく、それは理解できるにしても、文官としての恩給までも失った。彼は侍従長を長く勤め、そして降伏準備の任務をよくこなした。彼の提督という階級と戦時の首相という地位が追放に該当するのは当然としても、彼は、皇室に仕えていた地位の恩給の受け取りも現在停止されている。私は、鈴木提督個人のためだけでなく、このような価値剥奪が日本人に理解されず、占領軍の利益にも日本自身の利益にもならない反米感情をつくり出すという理由から、不安を募らせている。
原文
A Secret Message from the Showa Emperor
Whitney's papers
Ｔｈｅ document poses some unusual problems for scholars. Typed in English, classified "Top Secret," and covering a little more than three double-spaced pages, it is devoted entirely to summarizing the emperor's opinions as conveyed through an intermediary. Until the early 1970s, it was in the personal possession of MacArthur's former aide and personal confidant, General Courtney Whitney, although it is not mentioned in either Whitney's or MacArthur's memoirs. Whitney's papers were turned over to the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia, and declassified in 1978．
| The Text of the Memorandum [Verbatim reproduction of the original English typescript] He said that the Emperor wanted him to explain the basis for the latter's remark of a couple of weeks ago that he hoped the Occupation would not be too short. The Emperor felt that there were still many remnants of feudalism in the Japanese mind and that it would take a long time to eradicate them. He said the Japanese people as a whole were lacking in education which was necessary for their democratization and also that they were lacking in real religious feeling and were accordingly easy to sway from one extreme to the other. He said that one of the feudalistic traits was their willingness to be led and that they were not trained like Americans to think for themselves. He said the Tokugawa regime had been built on the theory that people should follow their leaders and should not be given any reason therefor except loyalty. Thus the average Japanese faced a traditional handicap in trying to think for himself. With his instinct to follow rather blindly, the Japanese were now eagerly endeavoring to adopt American ideas but, as witness the labor situation, they were selfishly concentrating their attention on their rights and not thinking about their duties and obligations. Part of the reason for this stems from the long-standing habit of clannishness in their thinking and attitudes. The days when the Japanese people were divided into clans are not really over. The average Japanese considers his relatives as friends whose interests he would pursue, and other people as enemies whose interests do not merit consideration. He said the Emperor had talked a great deal lately about the lack of religious feeling among the Japanese. The Emperor did not consider Shinto a religion. It was merely a ceremony and he thought that it had been greatly over-rated in the United States. It still had some dangerous aspects, however, because most Shintoists were ultra-conservative and they and ex-soldiers and others who had identified Shintoism with ultra-nationalism had a tendency to cling together. This was dangerous now the Government was without any means of supervusing [sic] them because of its strict observance under orders of the freedom of religion. The Emperor thought that the Shinto elements and their fellow travelers would bear watching because they were anti-American. The Emperor felt that this was no time to talk about whatever virtues the Japanese people possessed but rather to consider their faults. Some of theirfaults were indicated in the foregoing general outline of the Emperor's thoughts which had brought him to the conclusion that the Occupation should last for a long time. He said that the Emperor was very greatly impressed with General MacArthur and what he was doing. I said that General MacArthur was one of our greatest Americans who in his devotion to American and Allied interests at the same time, as the Emperor knew, had the best interests of the Japanese people at heart. I said that we Americans believed that Allied objectives for Japan were in the best interests of the Japanese as well as the world at large and we looked forward to the development of a democratic and economically sound Japan which would respect the rights of other nations and become a cooperative member of the commonwealth of nations. In response to an inquiry in regard to reparations, I said that General MacArthur is extremely anxious to have this question settled as soon as possible so that the Japanese industrialists could get down to work and produce goods needed for the purpose of paying for imports of food and for consumption in this country. I said that the General and his staff were doing everything they could to hasten the achievement of economic stability in Japan and I added some remarks in regard to the industry and thrift of the Japanese people and the need that they exert their best efforts for improvement of the economic situation. He said the Emperor appreciated very much the American attitude taken in the Allied Council, and felt that it had a stabilizing effect. But he was nowconsiderably worried over the labor situation in this country and hoped that the coal strike in the United States would be settled soon because the Japanese laborers, in their imitative way and in their selfish seeking of their rights without regard to their obligations, were being adversely affected by the American coal strike. He said the Emperor had remarked to him several times that the name given his reign--Showa or Enlightened Peace--now seemed to be a cynical one but that he wished to retain that designation and hoped that he would live long enough to insure that it would indeed be a reign of "Splendid Peace". He said that the Emperor was distressed over the loss by Admiral Suzuki, whom he had named to head the Cabinet to prepare for the surrender, of not only his Naval pension, which was understandable, but also his pension as a civil official. He had been Lord Chamberlain to the Emperor for a number of years, had done his job well in laying preparations for the surrender and, while his rank as Admiral and wartime status as Prime Minister naturally subjected him to purge, he was not prevented from receiving his pension due him from his position in the Imperial Household. The Emperor was perturbed not only for the sake of Admiral Suzuki personally but also because such deprivations, which were not understood by the Japanese, created anti-American feelings which were not in the interests of the Occupation or of Japan itself. JOHN W. DOWER is Elting E. Morison Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and author of Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II 資料名 General Whitney to C-in-C, dated 24 April 1946 年月日 24 April 1946 資料番号 GHQ/SCA 民政局文書 GHQ/SCAP Records Government Section;Box No. 2225 所蔵 国立国会図書館 原所蔵 米国国立公文書館 |